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We provide arguments and methods for reinterpreting statistics such as P-values
and interval estimates in unconditional terms, which describe compatibility of ob-
servationswith anentire set of analysis assumptions, rather than just a narrow tar-
get hypothesis. Such reinterpretations help avoid overconfident inferences when-
ever there is uncertainty about the assumptions used to derive and compute the
statistical results. Examples of such assumptions include not only standard sta-
tistical modeling assumptions, but also assumptions about absence of systematic
errors, protocol violations, and data corruption. Unconditional descriptions intro-
duce uncertainty about such assumptions directly into statistical presentations of
results, rather than leaving that uncertainty only to informal discussions. We thus
view unconditional description as a vital component of good statistical training
and presentation.
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1 | BACKGROUND
We have elsewhere reviewed proposals to reform ter-minology and improve interpretations of conven-
tional statistics by emphasizing logical and information
concepts over probability concepts [1–3]. This is because
they condition on background assumptions (i.e., they treat
them as given), and thus do not factor into their assess-
ments the uncertainties that surround those assumptions.
While various risk-assessmentmethods can incorporate
such uncertainties, thosemethods demand considerably
more skilled user input than do conventional regression
methods [4–6]. We thus present a relatively direct and
nontechnical approach to assumption uncertainty, called
deconditioning: Treat uncertain assumptions uncondition-
ally by shifting their logical status in descriptions, removing
them fromwhat is assumed and placing them instead into
what is tested.
Many readers will identify our background assump-
tions with the auxiliary assumptions in philosophical ac-
counts of theory testing [7–10]. Our usage however ex-
plicitly subsumes assumptions of researcher competence
and integrity in the conduct and reporting of statistical
analyses (which have come under fire in the “replication
crisis”), as well as narrow statistical assumptions (such as
regression linearity) and localmethodological assumptions
(such as no uncontrolled confounding). Perhaps because
of this generality, we have found that our recommenda-
tion to decondition inferences [3] is themost difficult for
sophisticated readers to comprehend, and is even resisted,
misunderstood, and misrepresented by some reviewers
with extensive credentials in statistics and philosophy.
Thus, the present paper explains at length our prac-
tical rationale for de-emphasizing traditional conditional
interpretations in favor of unconditional interpretations.
Our goal is to convey the core ideas to users and con-
sumers of statistics, not to satisfy academic or philosophi-
cal demands for rigor or completeness. We thusmake no
attempt to review the vast literature that could be argued
as discussing the same or similar ideas. The present pa-
per is instead a sequel to our general recommendations
for improving scientific interpretations of statistics [1]; for
brevity we assume the reader has that discussion (which is
open access).
2 | AN EXAMPLE
As in our previous paper [1], wewill illustrate problems and
recommendations with published results from a record-
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based cohort study of serotonergic antidepressant pre-
scriptions during pregnancy and subsequent autism spec-
trum disorder (ASD) of the child [11]. That paper first re-
ported an adjusted ratio of ASD rates (hazard ratio or HR)
of 1.59 when comparing mothers with and without the
prescriptions, and 95% compatibility (“confidence”) limits
(CI) of 1.17 and 2.17. This estimate was derived from a
proportional-hazards (PH) model which included mater-
nal age, parity, calendar year of delivery, neighborhood
income quintile, resource use, psychotic disorder, mood
disorder, anxiety disorder, alcohol or substance use dis-
order, use of other serotonergic medications, psychiatric
hospitalization during pregnancy, and psychiatric emer-
gency department visit during pregnancy.
The paper then presented an analysiswith adjustment
based on a high-dimensional propensity score (HDPS), in
which the estimated hazard ratio became 1.61with a 95%
CI spanning 0.997 to 2.59. Despite the estimated 61% in-
crease in the hazard rate in the exposed children and an
interval estimate including ratios as large as 2.59 and no
lower than 0.997, the authors still declared that “in utero
serotonergic antidepressant exposure comparedwith no
exposure was not associated with autism spectrum dis-
order in the child.” Although they also said that a causal
relationship cannot be ruled out, their main conclusion
was amisinterpretation of their own results, insofar as an
association was indeed present [12, 13] and quite close to
the 70% increase they reported from other studies [14].
In what follows, wewill explain the logic underpinning
correct descriptions of these results, such as,
“After HDPS adjustment for confounding, a 61%
hazard elevation remained; however, under the same
model, every hypothesis from no elevation up to a
160% hazard increase had p ≥ 0.05; Thus, while
quite imprecise, these results are most consistent
with previous observations of a positive association
between antidepressant exposure and subsequent
ASD (although the association may be partially or
wholly due to uncontrolled biases).”
3 | SOME TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
As before [1], we will consider only statistics that satisfy
themost basic frequentist validity criteria. In particular, a
P-value is valid for statistical testing if all possible values
for it from zero to one are equally likely (uniform in proba-
bility) when both the hypothesis under test and the back-
ground assumptions used in the test are correct. With this
validity criterionmet, we can also correctly describe the
P-value without explicit reference to repeated sampling,
as the percentile or proportion at which the observed test
statistic falls in the distribution for the test statistic un-
der the test hypothesis and the background assumptions
[15, 16]. The purpose of this description is to connect the
P-value to a familiar concept, the percentile atwhich some-
one’s score fell on a standard test (e.g., a college or grad-
uate admissions examination), as opposed to the remote
abstraction of infinitely repeated sampling. Our discussion
thus comes down to incorporating directly into statisti-
cal logic the various reasons why the P-value fell where
it did in this reference distribution, just as wewould con-
sider reasons why someone got the test score they did (for
a low score: didn’t study enough, was ill, etc.; for a high
score: intensive study, tutoring, cheating, etc.). We will
then describe the extension to compatibility (“confidence”)
intervals.
We emphasize that our use of the terms “conditional”
and “unconditional” is in the logical and common sense of
assuming vs. not assuming certain conditions (e.g., con-
trast the conditional “If this study is valid then the drug
must be effective” against the unconditional “Either this
study is invalid or else the drug must be effective”). This
is as opposed to technical statistical usage of the terms to
distinguish probability calculations that do vs. do not con-
dition on certain observed events (e.g., as in conditional
vs. unconditional tests in 2 x 2 tables), or to distinguish
conditional vs. unconditional model parameters (e.g., as in
subject-specific vs. group-level parameters inmodels for
clustered data).
4 | DECONDITIONING BY
EXPLICATION OF ALTERNATIVE
CAUSES OF OBSERVATIONS
As iswell known, the presence of an association inmultiple
observational studies does not by itself mean the drugs
under study cause autism. In fact, the authors argued that
the associations seen in their initial results [11, 14] rep-
resented confounding – a spurious association due to an
2
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association of the drugs with the actual causes. But such a
confounding hypothesis should not be confusedwith lack
of association; instead it should be treated as one of sev-
eral possible explanations (ranging from real drug effects
to random error), any or all of whichmay be contributing
to the observed associations.
The statistical adjustments used by Brown et al. [11,
14] were in fact designed to minimize confounding, and
thus they greatly diminish its plausibility as a major source
of the observed association. Furthermore, some of the
suggested explanationsmight have reduced the observed
association; in particular, random error is just as likely to
deflate as to inflate an observed association. But without
study design features to block alternative explanations
(e.g., randomization to prevent confounding), statistical re-
sults cannot settle thesematters. We thus need statistical
descriptions that avoid impressions of being definitive and
acknowledge possible alternative explanations.
Even when technically correct, common interpreta-
tions of statistics are deficient in this regard. Consider
that a test with p = 0.0625 yields s = − log2(p) = 4 bits of
information against the test hypothesisH, if all the assump-
tions used in the test are correct [1, 3]. This description is
conditional, in that it assumes an entire set of background
conditions in order to compute and interpret p and s. Typi-
cal examples of background assumptions include: patient
outcomes are independent; interactions and trends follow
the regressionmodel used for analysis (e.g., linear or logis-
tic); there is no uncontrolled source of systematic error
(e.g., no uncontrolled confounding, subject-selection bias,
measurement error, or sparse-data bias) [17]; and there is
no selective reporting of results based on their P-values,
interval estimates, or any other output – or if there is such
selection, it is accounted for in the computation of the final
results. Taken together, these background assumptions
compose the underlying analysis model.
We will refer to the combination of the test hypoth-
esisH and this underlying background assumptionsA as
the test model [18, 19]. In field studies and studies of hu-
man subjects, this test model is hypothetical, for it is never
the case that all the background assumptions are correct:
There are always study problems, and it is implausible that
any statistical model we use (whether for outcomes or ex-
posures) is correct or complete in all respects. Modest
violations of background assumptions can easily bias the P-
value toward 0 or 1, moving it over thresholds (regardless
of whether the test hypothesis is correct), thus invalidat-
ing decisions based in part on that P-value. In mechanis-
tic terms, possible nonrandom causes of an extreme test
statistic and thus a small P-value include not only the tar-
geted hypothesisH being wrong, but also or instead some
other assumption violation. Conversely, possible nonran-
domcauses of a large P-value include not only the targeted
hypothesisH being correct, but instead assumption viola-
tions that mask a true deviation fromH.
We thus can and should view the P-value as referring
to a probability derived from the entire testmodel, and the
S-value as measuring the information supplied by the test
statistic against that entiremodel. This description is un-
conditional because it places the background assumptions
on equal footing with the test hypothesis H: It explicitly
states that violation of any one of themmay be responsible
for the results, with no conditions imposed. For example,
selection of models that yield narrow intervals (for “higher
precision”)will cause smallP-values even if the test hypoth-
esis is correct. Then too, selection of models or methods
that yield wider intervals (for “conservative inferences”)
can cause large P-value even if the test hypothesis is false.
More generally, the smaller the P-value and thus the
larger the S-value we observed, themore justification we
have for saying that it appears one or more assumptions in
the test model is wrong. This unconditional analysis does
not however indicatewhich assumptions are wrong. The
reasons for the assumption violations might possibly in-
clude that the test hypothesisH is false, butmay instead or
in addition include uncontrolled bias, or data-collection er-
rors, or programming errors, or data “doctoring,” or some
other deviation from the background assumptions hidden
in traditional interpretations. This information limitation
of statistical analyses is inherent and universal; a notable
example is the report of faster-than-light neutrinos which
turned out to be due to equipment defects [20].
In parallel, if we observe a large P-value and thus a
small S-value, we cannot conclude that there is no viola-
tion of any assumption; quite contrarily, it may be that
the assumption violations biased the P-value upward in-
stead of downward. This caution is just the unconditional
version of the warning dating back to Pearson [21] and
often repeated since [22–25], that a large P-value is not
evidence that the test hypothesis is correct. As reflected
3
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by the small S-value, it simplymeans the test supplied lit-
tle information against the test hypothesis or any other
assumption used to compute the P-value. This lack of infor-
mation reflects only the limitations of the test (which in
turnmay reflect limitations of the study), not the absence
of an effect.
5 | THE NECESSITY OF
UNCONDITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS
The conditional and unconditional interpretations are con-
trasted in Figure 1, which shows how the conditional inter-
pretation
• (A) targets only the test hypothesis H under the du-
bious condition that there are no violations of back-
ground assumptions, whereas the unconditional inter-
pretation
• (B) targets the entire set of assumptions used to frame
the test.
The unconditional interpretation is usually far more
appropriate in health and medical sciences, where re-
searchers rarely achieve full control of all potential sources
of systematic error (even randomized trialswill suffer from
drop-out, censoring and related problems that may create
bias). In contrast, in many “hard science” experiments re-
searchers may control all important conditions and thus
justify a conditional interpretation – but again, serious ex-
ceptions occur even in particle physics [20].
We view explication of the conditional vs. uncondi-
tional distinction as crucial to good teaching, and the un-
conditional view as essential for good practice: When (as
usual in our experience) there is meaningful doubt about
the assumptions underlying a statistical procedure, we
need to remind ourselves of the unconditional fact that
any result (“large” or “small”) may have occurred not only
from “chance” but also from assumption violations. Such
reminders are seen in well-reported studies, which list and
caution about possible sources of bias in the study. We
thus hold that unconditional interpretations need to be
covered whenever any reasonable doubt can be raised
about background assumptions.
The unconditional interpretation is far more helpful
than the conditional when there are concerns about vio-
lations of assumptions, including protocol violations. Sup-
pose for example there are plausible concerns about vi-
olations of the data collection, processing, or reporting
protocols.
A common concern is that a P-value was selected for
special emphasis out of several based on its size (whether
for being high, “downward hacking”; or low, “upward hack-
ing”), or one CI of several was emphasized while others
were downplayed based on including vs. excluding the null
(e.g., contrast the discussion of HDPS and proportional-
hazards model results in Brown et al. [11]) – or worse,
some results gounreportedbasedonwhat they show (thus
becoming nonrandomlymissing information). or a CI was
selected from several based on including or excluding the
null, while the other results were downplayed or unre-
ported (thus becoming nonrandomlymissing data informa-
tion).
A conditional interpretation assumes there is no such
uncontrolled selection of summaries based onwhat they
favor, and so is misleadingwhen selection occurs. In con-
trast, an unconditional interpretation simply lists uncon-
trolled selection bias among the possible causes contribut-
ing to the observed P-value.
6 | THE CENTRAL ROLE OF CAUSAL
EXPLANATIONS IN INTERPRETING
STATISTICS
To understand statistics in their scientific context, , we
must imagine an open-ended list of contextually plausible
mechanistic (causal) explanations for the observed statis-
tics. With conditional interpretations, the only explana-
tions allowed from that list are those consistent with the
background assumptions used to compute the statistics;
thus, in testing, conditional explanations can only enlist
some combination of random error and violation of the
test hypothesisH. Because assumption uncertainty is ne-
glected by this interpretation, it creates an illusion that
“nonsignificance”/”significance” should be treated as the
true/false indicator forH.
In contrast, an unconditional interpretation consid-
ers the entire list, including nonrandom physical (causal)
mechanisms that violate background assumptions rather
thanH; such mechanismsmay for example produce non-
randomlymissing information (informative censoring).
4
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Figure 1: Conditional versus unconditional interpretations of P-values, S-values, and compatibility
intervals (CIs). (A) Conditional interpretation, in which background model assumptions, such as no sys-
tematic error, are assumed to be correct; thus, the information provided by the P-value and S-value is
targeted towards the test hypothesis. (B) Unconditional interpretation, in which no aspect of the sta-
tistical model is assumed to be correct; thus, the information provided by the P-value and S-value is
targeted toward the entire test model.
This list of possible explanations needs to contain
any plausible causal mechanism [26]. In typical social and
biomedical applications, there will bemultiple such expla-
nations, and they will not bemutually exclusive; for exam-
ple, an explanation for a temporally directed association
will include direct causation, bias, random error, and ev-
ery combination of the three that produces what was ob-
served.
The multiple explanations allowed by the uncondi-
tional view show why it would be fallacious to say that
an S-valuemeasures the information supporting or favor-
ing an alternative hypothesis. Considering the example,
it would be wrong to say the S-value of 4.31 against the
no-effect hypothesis (that the drug does not affect risk)
measures the information favoring the alternative that tak-
ing the drug increases risk: Such an interpretation would
have to assume that the 61% higher rate seen with the
drug is solely a product of genuine drug effects and ran-
dom errors, which is not credible due to the possibility of
systematic errors from failure of background assumptions
(such as the assumption of no uncontrolled bias).
7 | COMPATIBILITY IS
INTENTIONALLY LIMITED
Onemay object that, even unconditionally, compatibility
interpretationswill still be biasedby assumption violations.
That objection is simply a failure to understand themean-
ing of “unconditional”: Unconditionally, “high compatibil-
ity” merely says the chosen testing procedure did not de-
tect an assumption violation; it makes no claim whatsoever
that such violation or the resulting bias is absent. It is thus a re-
sponse to themaxim “absence of evidence is not evidence
of absence” [25] in the formof a retreat from any inference
about why the data and themodel appear as compatible
or incompatible as they do.
In general, unconditional compatibility interpreta-
tions refuse demands for conclusive assessments, even
of uncertainty. The core idea is that conventional statistics
can only gauge incompatibilities between our data and the
5
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models we use to analyze that data. At most, those statis-
tics provide only falsification (never support) of the precise
and detailed explanations represented by certain models.
And because there is no restriction on how model viola-
tionsmay occur, the low compatibility of onemodel with
the data does not provide support for a competitor: Each
alternativemodel needs to be evaluated directly against
the data, with its own P-value and S-value.
Thus, unconditional descriptions are far more appro-
priately reserved and cautious compared to conditional
descriptions. While this cautionmay seem excessive, jus-
tification of conditional descriptions requires empirical
evidence against mechanisms that lead to assumption vio-
lations. And in one respect the unconditional interpreta-
tion is not cautious enough, because it is no substitute for
model diagnostics such as residual plots and direct tests of
model fit.
Unfortunately, some assumptions (such as no unre-
portedmodel selection [27, 28]) will be untestable for the
reader, while other assumptions will remain untestable
(nonidentifiable) even if we are given the study data and
full details on how it was collected. For example, the hy-
pothesis that an observed association (or lack thereof) was
due to confounding by an unmeasured variable cannot
be testedwithout assumptions about the relation of that
variable to those observed. Thus, if such a hypothesis is
entertained seriously, an unconditional interpretation will
avoid referring to the observed association as an “effect
estimate” because the latter term invites conditioning on
the assumption that the analysis successfully adjusted for
all important confounding.
8 | UNCONDITIONAL INTERVAL
ESTIMATES: COMPATIBILITY
WITHOUT COVERAGE CLAIMS
A confidence interval (CI) is often defined as an interval
that contains the true parameter value some percentage
of the time (usually 95%) in some hypothetical “long run”
involving unlimited study repetitions, with only random
errors causing interval variation across these repetitions.
Consequently, most descriptions write as if CIs are only
defined or justified by their long-run coverage properties
under the background assumptions [29], without consid-
ering unconditional interpretations.
One objection often raised to coverage is the unreality
of the very hypothetical repetitions in which said coverage
is supposed to take place, a long run which is in fact not
necessary under information interpretations [3, 15]. Our
primary concern however is that when the assumptions
(model) used to compute the interval cannot be assured,
neither can coverage, and the resulting confidence inter-
val becomes an overconfidence interval [3, 22]. The cover-
age interpretation conveys valid information only when
we know the assumption violations would not reduce cov-
erage; otherwise, in the face of assumption uncertainty,
coverage becomes an irrelevant conditional interpretation
[3, 22, 30, 31]. We thus argue that teaching and practice
should de-emphasize long-run coverage in favor of more
descriptive, purely logical properties of the intervals as
provided by unconditional interpretations.
Specifically, we can bypass the need for a coverage
interpretation by using the complementary mathemati-
cal relation between P-values and CIs. A CI of a particu-
lar level, say 95%, summarizes the results of varying the
test hypothesis H over a range of parameter values, dis-
playing all values for which p > α = 0.05 [32] and hence s
< − log2(0.05) = 4.32 bits [3, 22]. Thus, conditional on the
background assumptions, theCI contains a range of param-
eter values that are more compatible with the data than
values outside the interval [3, 19]. This is so, regardless
of the particular cutoff α chosen for the interval. Uncon-
ditionally, and regardless of long-run coverage, the interval
shows the values of the parameter which, when combined
with the background assumptions, produce a test model
that is “highly compatible” with the data in the sense of
having less than − log2(α) bits of information against the
resulting test model. We thus refer to CI as compatibility
intervals rather than confidence intervals [3, 22]; their ab-
breviation remains “CI.”
A CI shows the conditional compatibility between the
data and various target-parameter values, given the back-
groundmodel assumptions; but it also shows unconditional
compatibility between the data and a family ofmodels iden-
tical apart from a varying target parameter [3, 22]. The
unconditional-compatibility interpretation is important
whenever background assumptions are uncertain, for then
coverage becomes uncertain. In that case we can say that
the interval describes a family of models defined by vary-
ing the parameter or hypothesis, plus the fixed set of back-
6
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ground assumptions. Thesemodels differ only in the value
they assign to the parameter targeted in the hypothesis
H; they share the property the data provide “little” infor-
mation against them (less than 4.32 bits for 95% intervals,
less than 6.64 bits for 99% intervals)).
Another attempt at expressing caution due to uncer-
tain assumptions is to describe CIs as only gauging the
amount of random error in the results [33]. For example,
a randomized trial that produces a CI for a hazard ratio
ranging from 0.90 (a 10% rate decrease) and as high as
20 (a 20-fold rate increase) is taken to indicate that the
results are too noisy to pin down even the direction of the
association. This view leads to use of interval estimates to
plan studies for precision based on desired interval width
[33, 34] (rather than statistical power, where one fixates
on rejecting or failing to reject the test hypothesis). From
the compatibility view, the goal is to ensure that the re-
gion of compatibility above a given level is narrow enough
tomake the study reasonably informative under the back-
ground assumptions. That goal does not however address vi-
olation of those assumptions, which can drastically reduce
the informativeness of the study; it can also bias estimates
of random variation [30]. Thus the “random error only”
interpretation of CIs is not an effective substitute for the
unconditional interpretation.
9 | DISCUSSION
9.1 | WHAT ABOUT THE NEED FOR
DECISIONS?
Wehave been concerned only with how to validly describe
statistical summaries. Decisions based on those sum-
maries are often needed, but statistical decision theory
[35] is amassive, deep topic beyond not only our current
scope but that of the vast majority of users and consumers
of statistics. A key point is that, when background assump-
tions are uncertain, neither conditional nor unconditional
summarizations suffice for statistical decision methods:
Those methods require some type of utility measure or
loss function, alongwith prior distributions (whether em-
pirical or subjective) that incorporate all the important
uncertainties in the application. The conventional dichoto-
mous decision framework (rejecting or accepting hypothe-
ses based onwhether a P-value passes some cutoff or an
interval includes a parameter value) is based entirely on
the conditional interpretation; whenever that involves as-
suming as if known things that are unknown, it fails the re-
quirement for uncertainty accounting. The persistence of
the conventional framework despite such deficiencies re-
flects the complexity of better methods and lack of agree-
ment about simple replacements; but again, this is a huge
topic beyond our current scope.
10 | CONCLUSION
Treating formal statistics as if they capture all important
uncertainty sources has been labeled uncertainty launder-
ing [36], which is exactly what is done whenever discus-
sions revolve aroundwhether results are “statistically sig-
nificant” orwhether interval estimates contain a null value.
Even when such laundering is not done, expressions of un-
certainty about analysis assumptions is usually reserved
for informal discussion, which often consists of “walking
back” conditional descriptions from the results section.
In contrast, unconditional descriptions introduce as-
sumption uncertainty directly into statistical presenta-
tions of results, recognizing that those results cannot claim
to have captured uncertainty if there are plausible doubts
about the assumptions or models used to derive the statis-
tics. We thus view unconditional description as a vital
component of good statistical training and presentation,
one that should be at the forefront of the statistical reform
movement.
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